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(a) Background
When the a quo decision in Allaclas Investments v Milnerton Golf Club1 was
reported I initially regarded it as a straightforward and sensible application of
‘normal’, well-established neighbour law principles.
The applicants owned or occupied residential property in a development
bordering on the Milnerton Golf Course that was marketed as a golf estate.2
They claimed that their houses on several occasions had been hit by stray golf
balls. The second applicant had at one point erected a net around part of his
property, but this did not solve the problem and obscured his view of Table
Mountain.3 The respondent planted trees that would (in time) eventually
screen the houses from stray golf balls, but this solution had not yet become
effective.4 Applicants wanted the respondent to take more immediate
measures, including reducing the sixth hole from a par 5 to a par 4, but this
would have affected the functioning of the golf course and would have
caused similar problems for owners elsewhere along the course.5 Respon-
dents temporarily reduced the sixth hole to a par 4 on all days but
Wednesdays and Saturdays, but contended that the applicants had not made a
* A short paper based on this article was presented at the South African Property
Law Teachers’ annual conference, 30 October 2009, Stellenbosch. Parts of the article
are based on sections from chapter 6 (Nuisance) of A J van der Walt The Law of
Neighbours (forthcoming, 2010). Thanks to Bradley Slade (who prepared the
materials for this article) and to Alton Samuels and Sue-Mari Maass for research
assistance with the book chapter.
1 Allaclas Investments (Pty) Ltd v Milnerton Golf Club (Steltzner & others intervening)
2007 (2) SA 40 (C). See C G van der Merwe & J M Pienaar ‘The law of property
(including real security)’ 2007 ASSAL 961 at 986–8; J Neethling & J Potgieter ‘The
law of delict’2007 ASSAL 767 at 781–2 for a discussion of the a quo decision.
2 Allaclas (C) para 3.
3 See note 12 below.
4 Allaclas (C) para 5.
5 Some of the other owners therefore intervened to argue against this remedy:
ibid paras 18, 21.
274
convincing case to substantiate an order that would compel them to make
that arrangement permanent.6
The Cape High Court conﬁrmed the general neighbour law principle that
the reasonableness of a landowner’s actions, in so far as they affect neigh-
bours, has to be assessed with reference to the kind and location of the
properties involved, their normal use, and local custom concerning their
use.7 In this context, the court decided, an owner of property adjoining a golf
course had to expect a certain level of intrusion from stray golf balls and also
had to be willing to undertake steps to alleviate the problem.8 The applicants
accepted that their use and enjoyment of property would be restricted by its
location on a golf course, but complained that the incidence of stray golf balls
hitting their home were unacceptably high and that some of the stray balls
had caused damage to their houses.9 However, the court held that it had not
been established that the incidence of stray golf balls actually hitting the
property was extraordinarily high, or that the damage caused was unreason-
ably serious for the context or the kind of property involved.10 From the
court’s perspective, it seemed as if the applicants were not displaying the
necessary neighbourly tolerance.11 After all, reasonableness means not only
that landowners should not be subjected to unlawful annoyances caused by
the use of neighbouring land, but also that they have to put up with a
reasonable level of disturbances caused by normal and otherwise lawful use of
neighbouring land. In the court’s view, it seemed as if the applicants simply
wanted to sit back, expecting the respondents to solve the problem.12 The
application for injunctive relief was accordingly dismissed because it had not
been shown that the respondents had unreasonably interfered with the rights
of the applicants.13
6 Ibid para 14.
7 Ibid paras 17, 20–2.
8 Ibid para 22. This principle was established in Malherbe v Ceres Municipality 1951
(4) SA510 (A), where the court said that landowners had to undertake the small effort
or expense required to clear their own gutters of fallen and wind-blown leaves, even
if those leaves should come from other properties. See further Vogel v Crewe 2003 (4)
SA509 (T).
9 Allaclas (C) supra note 1 para 13.
10 Ibid para 20. In this passage the court argued that the mere fact that stray golf
balls entered the applicant’s property did not constitute nuisance; it was necessary to
prove that the stray balls caused or threatened to cause damage to property or physical
injury.
11 Ibid in para 21 the court considered the attitude of the applicant as one of the
factors that should be taken into account when deciding whether the action was
reasonable.
12 Ibid paras 21, 22. The court thought that the applicants were loath to protect
their property by erecting a suitable net because it obstructed their view. However, in
the decision on appeal it was pointed out that the net in fact did not reduce the
number of balls that entered the property: Allaclas Investments (Pty) Ltd v Milnerton Golf
Club 2008 (3) SA134 (SCA) para 8.
13 Allaclas (C) paras 25, 27.
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When the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned this decision and granted
the applicants injunctive relief I was therefore initially quite surprised.14
However, I soon realised that I had underestimated the complexities of the
case because I had failed to make a vital distinction between two different
kinds of nuisance, namely nuisance that causes discomfort or annoyance and
nuisance that causes damage to property or injury to persons. South African
textbooks on property law mention the distinction between nuisance in the
narrow (annoyance) and in the wide (damage or injury) sense, but the courts
(including the two Allaclas decisions) have so far not drawn this distinction
very clearly or consistently. My purpose in this article is to argue that this
distinction should be made explicitly and clearly and that it should determine
the adjudication of a number of crucial issues in nuisance cases.
The Supreme Court of Appeal decided that the applicants were entitled to
an interdict that would force the respondents to suspend use of the sixth hole
until the necessary measures had been taken to prevent a repetition of the
disturbance complained of. In one sense, the decision on appeal can be
explained purely on the facts, since the Supreme Court of Appeal decided,
contrary to the court a quo, that the applicants were indeed subjected to
unreasonably high levels of dangerous intrusions by stray golf balls.15 In the
court’s view, the evidence indicated that golf balls hit the appellants’ property
with such regularity and in such a dangerous way that their ability to use and
enjoy their property normally was signiﬁcantly affected.16 The number of
golf balls entering their property was therefore ‘clearly excessive and
unreasonable in the circumstances’.17 Accordingly, they were entitled to an
interdict that would force the respondents to suspend use of the sixth hole
until the necessary preventative measures had been taken.18 In this perspec-
tive, the difference between the decision a quo and the decision on appeal is
explained by different interpretations of the facts, with the one court
thinking that the infringement was not serious enough and the other
thinking that it was. On the face of it, both decisions rest on the same
principle: nuisance is a question of reasonableness and therefore the intensity
14 Allaclas (SCA) supra note 12.
15 The High Court decision merely refers to golf balls having entered the appli-
cants’ property ‘on several occasions’ (para 4), without going into the actual number
of hits and instead concentrating on the question whether the stray balls actually
caused damage or injury or merely entered the property or were found there (para
20), while the Supreme Court of Appeal referred explicitly to the actual number of
stray hits that were counted (875 between December 2003 and March 2006: para 7),
the number of hits in areas where they endangered the physical integrity of the
applicant’s family (21 out of 57 entering the swimming pool between November
2004 and January 2005: para 19) and the force with which they hit (according to a
photograph: para 19). It is unclear whether all the physical evidence was available to
the trial court, but the more explicit analysis of the facts in the decision on appeal
certainly paints a different picture of the danger posed by the stray golf balls.
16 Allaclas (SCA) supra note 12 paras 7, 18.
17 Ibid para 20.
18 Ibid para 25.
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of the immission plays a large role in determining whether it is actionable.
Should the facts establish that the intrusion by stray golf balls was indeed so
excessively high as to have a signiﬁcant impact on the appellants’ use of their
own property, the decision would be justiﬁed to stop the nuisance until
remedial measures have been put in place. On this reading, the Supreme
Court of Appeal seemed to have followed the same logic as the trial court: it
would be reasonable for the appellants to tolerate a small number of stray golf
balls entering their property, but ‘what they have had to endure clearly goes
substantially further than what a neighbour is obliged to put up with on
application of the principle of ‘‘give and take, live and let live’’, which forms
the basis of our law on this point’.19 On this interpretation, the reversal of the
initial order is explained by the Supreme Court of Appeal’s different
assessment of the facts, without referring to the distinction between nuisance
in the narrow and in the wide sense. However, I will argue that this
distinction provides a better explanation for the reversal of the decision a
quo.
(b) An alternative explanation
Apart from the facts, there is another interpretation that could explain the
reversal on appeal of the original decision even more convincingly. The basis
on which the reversal was discussed above is the ‘normal’ principle of
reasonableness, according to which landowners have to tolerate a reasonable
level of noise, dust and similar effects of the normal and reasonable use of
neighbouring land. This principle of tolerance is suspended when the
intrusion exceeds the level of reasonableness; at that point the neighbours are
no longer required to accept the interference with their use and enjoyment
of their own land. In this context, the distinction between reasonable effects
of the use of neighbouring land and unlawful nuisance is a question of
degree; of staying within or exceeding the limit of tolerance.
The alternative interpretation I want to raise involves a different kind of
assessment. As soon as normal and lawful use of one property causes (or
threatens to cause)20 actual material damage or personal injury to occupiers of
neighbouring land (as opposed to mere annoyance or discomfort), the
ordinary physical comfort test is not applied at all and an interdict should be
available to prevent or stop the nuisance, without the complainant having to
show that the damage or injury exceeds the ordinary physical comfort level
of a reasonable person.21 In effect, this means that, in contrast with the
19 Ibid para 21.
20 I add this qualiﬁcation because the disputes often reach the courts at a stage
where the damage has not yet occurred or where it is ongoing and where the point is
to avoid or terminate the threat. Without repeating the point I assume that the threat
is real and imminent; otherwise the courts will not take notice, in accordance with
the normal principles for awarding either an interdict or damages. I shall return to this
point below.
21 This interpretation ﬁnds support in J R L Milton ‘The law of neighbours in
SouthAfrica’1969 Acta Juridica 123 at 151–2.
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normal nuisance principles, there is no reasonable level of actual damage or
physical injury that neighbours are supposed to tolerate. Nuisance that causes
(or threatens to cause) actual damage to property or physical injury is judged
differently from nuisance that merely annoys or inconveniences neighbours,
in the sense that the reasonableness test is determinative in the latter but not
applied in the former case. As soon as the Supreme Court in Allaclas decided
that the facts established a high incidence of stray golf balls that struck the
appellants’property in a dangerous way, the threat of damage or injury shifted
the focus and the issue was no longer whether the appellants were supposed
to bear with a certain level of discomfort caused by normal use of the
neighbouring golf course, but rather whether they should be protected
against the real and imminent threat of damage to their property or physical
injury.
The courts are not always equally clear about this principle and about the
difference between the two categories. In Allaclas the Supreme Court of
Appeal’s reversal of the initial order could be read as a conﬁrmation of either
the ‘normal’ approach or as an application of the alternative approach. In
Dorland v Smits22 it was held that the mere threat of danger (without any
proof of actual damage or injury) does not constitute a nuisance per se; the
question was whether the limitations that the threat imposed on the
applicant’s use of her property exceeded the boundaries of what could be
expected of her. This could of course be seen as conﬁrmation of the normal
principle, where it is required that the intrusion on normal use should exceed
the level of reasonableness, just like the appeal decision in Allaclas seems to
focus on the degree to which the appellants’ ability to use their property was
signiﬁcantly affected by the intrusion. However, both decisions could also be
read as focusing on the probability that the threat of injury posed by the
intrusion might realise, rather than on the degree or level of the intrusion.
According to the normal line of thinking, the appellants would be entitled
to an interdict because their normal use of their own property was
signiﬁcantly infringed by the unacceptably high number of stray golf balls
ﬂying onto their property.According to the alternative approach, they would
be entitled to an interdict simply because the stray golf balls posed a serious
and real threat to their property or physical integrity. In the ﬁrst case, the
number of stray balls at a certain point exceeds a limit where the annoyance
that they cause is of a level or magnitude that the neighbour can tolerate. In
the second case, the number of stray balls is important only in so far as a
higher number and greater force of the hits establish the probability that the
danger or threat posed by any single ball would in fact realise. In this case, it is
not the level of annoyance or reasonableness of the intrusion that had to be
established by proving a high incidence of stray balls striking the applicant’s
property, but the probability that the threat would materialise.
The remedy that the Supreme Court ofAppeal granted to the applicants in
22 2002 (5) SA374 (C) at 384A–B.
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Allaclas demonstrates the difference between the two approaches outlined
above when compared with the order given in Laskey v Showzone CC.23 In
Laskey, a case concerning noise in the inner city, the court also granted
injunctive relief because it considered the noise caused by the respondents
excessive, even in the location, but it suspended the interdict to give the
respondent a reasonable time to install the necessary insulation, without
thereby affecting his business. The stricter order in Allaclas, where the owners
of the golf course had to suspend play until the necessary steps could be taken,
might be justiﬁed because of the threat of actual damage to property or
personal injury. Although there is no clear explanation or justiﬁcation in the
case law, this reading of the cases suggests that the choice of remedy is
affected by the distinction between ‘normal’ or narrow nuisance cases and
cases where the nuisance causes or threatens to cause damage to property or
personal injury. In the latter category, it seems, injunctive relief should be the
rule rather than the exception, the injunction would not be suspended
simply to give the offender time to continue doing business while complying
with the order, and an award of damages should only be employed as a
remedy in exceptional cases.
Of course it is possible simply to take the Supreme Court of Appeal on its
word and accept that the normal principles of nuisance have been applied in
Allaclas — that the high incidence of stray balls exceeded the level of
tolerance that is expected of any neighbour, and that the appellants were
therefore entitled to an interdict to have the use of the golf course suspended
until suitable preventive measures have been taken. However, the alternative
explanation creates an opportunity to reconsider aspects of neighbour law
relating to nuisance caused by sport from a different angle.
(c) ‘Coming to the nuisance’
The issue of coming to the nuisance was raised in the trial court, the
respondents arguing that the applicants (appellants) could not complain about
stray golf balls when they chose to build a house right next to a golf course.
The applicants accepted that ‘by virtue of the fact that they own/occupy a
property which borders on a fairway of a golf course, their right to free and
undisturbed use of their property will be interfered with to some extent’;
their complaint was that the number of golf balls actually entering their
property exceeded the limits of what was reasonably to be expected, even
when living on a golf estate.24 The trial court agreed with the applicants’
argument that coming to the nuisance was no defence, deciding that none of
the sources cited by the respondents could ‘elevate ‘‘coming to the nuisance’’
to a legal principle which is at variance with the basic principles of the law of
delict’.25 The applicants’ decision to buy property next to a golf course was
23 2007 (2) SA48 (C) paras 40–7.
24 Allaclas (C) supra note 1 para 13.
25 Ibid para 15. Counsel for the applicants relied on foreign case law, including the
unreported decision in Campbelltown Golf Club Ltd v Winton [1998] NSWSC 257
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relevant to the question whether the respondent’s actions were reasonable,
but it was not decisive.26
It is safe to say that ‘coming to the nuisance’ does not in itself offer a
complete defence against a nuisance action in South African law, although
the prior existence of the source of the alleged nuisance and the complain-
ant’s choice to occupy land in its vicinity could indicate that any relatively
minor annoyance caused by it would not be unreasonable and thus not
actionable. On the one hand, the fact that the plaintiff voluntarily occupied
premises in the vicinity of a known and already existing nuisance is not a
complete defence against an action based on nuisance.27 The principle is that
priority of occupation does not automatically entitle one landowner to use
her property in such a way as to deprive neighbours of the reasonable physical
comfort and enjoyment of their property.28 On the other hand, though, the
fact that the nuisance existed at the time when the plaintiff moved to its
location might be a defence under certain circumstances, or it might
inﬂuence the decision whether the nuisance is unreasonable.29 Whether
causing the nuisance is unreasonable must be established in every individual
case with reference to all the circumstances, including the question whether
the use of the respondent’s property that causes the annoyance is lawful,
normal in the location and context, and reasonable as far as its intensity, time
of occurrence and duration and its effect on others are concerned. One might
also expect changing circumstances to play a role in rendering previous
seemingly reasonable or lawful use of property unreasonable and unlawful.
This conclusion is in line with the position in foreign law, where the
notion of coming to the nuisance is not viewed as an absolute defence that
would exclude any nuisance claim purely because the source of the nuisance
existed before the complainant occupied the neighbouring land.30 In a
well-known English case31 the court refused to stop the long-standing
practice of playing cricket on the village green, although the majority did
hold that the club was liable in negligence and nuisance because of the real
threat of damage or injury caused by stray cricket balls. I return to this
(40056/1995, 23 June 1998), in which the facts were very similar to those in Allaclas.
In the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Allaclas supra note 12 para 17 it was said
that theAustralian decision ‘reﬂects precisely what a SouthAfrican court would have
held in the closely analogous factual circumstances of this case’. I return to Campbell-
town in section II below.
26 Allaclas (C) supra note 1 para 16.
27 J Church & J Church ‘Nuisance’ in WA Joubert, J A Faris & LT C Harms (eds)
The Law of South Africa vol 19 2 ed (2006) para 210, citing Howard Farrar, Robinson &
Co Ltd v East London Municipality 1908 EDC 149; Miller v Jackson [1977] 1 QB 966
(CA).
28 This is essentially also what the New South Wales Supreme Court decided in
Campbelltown Golf Club Ltd v Winton supra note 25.
29 Church & Church op cit note 27 para 210, citing Miller v Jackson supra note 27.
30 Coming to the nuisance is not recognised as a defence in either English law,
Australian law or Canadian law; see the references in section II of the article below.
31 Miller v Jackson supra note 27.
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decision below. The prior existence of the source of the nuisance is generally
acknowledged as a factor in deciding whether the defendant’s use of her
property is reasonable and lawful, but in itself this factor does not trump the
use right of neighbours. Traverso DJP thus reﬂected a generally accepted
principle when she stated in Allaclas that the fact that the complainant ‘came
to the nuisance’was a relevant, but not in itself decisive, factor.32
Although the defence of coming to the nuisance is generally not accepted,
the sympathy that courts may have with defendants who have used their land
in the same way for a long time may also ﬁnd expression in the principle that
a plaintiff in nuisance cannot expect a higher level of comfort than is
customary in the particular context — the locality principle. Outside of sport
cases it has been established that the courts would expect applicants to show a
relatively high tolerance level against nuisance that was known to exist or
that could be expected in their vicinity. In these cases the idea of coming to
the nuisance was not accepted as an absolute defence, but the courts have
been adamant that landowners should be reasonably tolerant of disturbances
that could be described as normal and reasonable or that should be expected
in the area. Residents in an inner-city area thus have to tolerate the kind and
level of noise that could be expected there,33 just as they have to tolerate the
electriﬁed security fencing34 or the leaves falling from trees that one should
expect in urban residential areas.35 These cases conﬁrm the general principle
that the reasonableness of disturbances emanating from the normal and
otherwise lawful use of land should be determined with reference to the
context within which they occur. It has been pointed out in the literature
that the locality principle was emphasised so strongly in Miller v Jackson36 that
the general rejection of the coming to the nuisance defence was effectively
circumvented.37
However, the cases that illustrate the locality principle are qualiﬁed by a
widely accepted proviso: it does not apply if the nuisance causes damage to
property or personal injury. This proviso helps to explain the Allaclas decision
on appeal: the nuisance caused by city noise or falling leaves is in the nature of
an annoyance or a discomfort, a disturbance of the senses rather than a threat
of actual damage to property or personal injury.38 One could therefore say
that the Allaclas decision indicates that, even though the locality principle
plays an important role in the application of the reasonableness test in South
African nuisance law, it has less or no purchase in cases where the nuisance
causes a real and signiﬁcant threat of damage to property or personal injury, as
32 Allaclas (C) supra note 1 para 16.
33 Laskey v Showzone CC supra note 23 paras 19–32, 47.
34 Dorland v Smits supra note 22.
35 Malherbe v Ceres Municipality supra note 8; Vogel v Crewe supra note 8.
36 Supra note 27. See further RABuckley ‘Cricket and the law of nuisance’ (1978)
41 Modern LR 334.
37 See section II(c) below.
38 Buckley op cit note 36 argues that the same applies to the comparable English
cases; see section II(d) below.
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opposed to cases where the nuisance involves a mere disturbance or
annoyance. The locality principle indicates that a higher level of tolerance or
forbearance might be expected of the complainant in a nuisance case, but this
aspect of the reasonableness test does not carry the same weight in cases
where the nuisance causes or threatens damage to property or personal
injury, and therefore the Allaclas decision in the SCAcould be explained with
reference to the nature of the nuisance and not just the level or intensity of
the disturbance.
(d) Abuse of rights
The doctrine of abuse of rights also featured in the Allaclas case. In the trial
court Traverso DJP argued that ‘[a] dispute between neighbours invariably
involves, among other things, the question whether there has been an abuse
of a right’ and that the question should be ‘whether the neighbour whose
conduct is being complained of exceeded his powers of ownership’ in view
of considerations of reasonableness and fairness.39 This is a somewhat unusual
approach to both the concept of nuisance and the doctrine of abuse of rights.
Of course it is true that nuisance law is founded on the principle that every
landowner should use her land in such a way that it does not cause harm for
neighbours,40 but that does not mean that causing actionable nuisance
amounts to abuse of rights — on the contrary, the more conventional view is
that nuisance starts off with normal and lawful use of one’s own land and
becomes unlawful and actionable when the effects that it has on neighbour-
ing land become unreasonable. Contrary to what the decision seems to
suggest, malice might be a factor in establishing actionable nuisance, but it is
not required. The doctrine of abuse of rights, on the other hand, is usually
associated with the malicious exercise of rights, which could occur either if
the offending landowner uses her land purely to cause harm or annoyance for
neighbours,41 or if the complaining neighbour maliciously insists on vindi-
cating her right, with grave negative effects for the other party, but without
acquiring any signiﬁcant beneﬁt from it herself.42 In foreign law the doctrine
plays an important role in preventing either purely malicious exercises of
one’s rights or use of property that could in principle be lawful, but which are
39 Allaclas (C) supra note 1 para 9.
40 Usually expressed with reference to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas. D van der Merwe Oorlas in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1982) 430 summarises
variations of this maxim found in the neighbour law cases, all of which reﬂect the
underlying principle stated by Gaius Institutes 1.53: ‘mala enim nostro iure uti non
debemus’ (for we ought not to abuse our lawful right; translation of F de Zulueta The
Institutes of Gaius part I Text with Critical Notes and Translation (1946) 17).
41 The clearest South African case is Kirsch v Pincus 1927 TPD 199; see note 45
below.
42 The clearest SouthAfrican example is Lombard v Fischer [2003] 1All SA698 (O),
an encroachment case, in which the applicant attempted to enforce her right of
exclusion purely to spite the neighbour.
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rendered unreasonable and unlawful by the spite or malice with which the
rights are exercised under the speciﬁc circumstances of the case.43
There is authority in South African law for the view that use of one’s own
property that is aimed exclusively at causing harm for a neighbour would be
unlawful because it amounts to abuse of rights, although it is sometimes said
that the doctrine harbours a contradiction in terms because one cannot abuse
a right.44 On the basis of the explanations developed in foreign law one could
say, however, that it is indeed possible to abuse a right in the sense that having
a right (such as ownership of land) does not allow uses of that right that would
generally be lawful but that are, in the circumstances, designed purely to
43 The doctrine is embodied in two separate sections of the Dutch civil code. The
general provision regarding abuse of right in BW 3:13.1 states that a person cannot
rely on a right in cases when she is abusing it. Three examples are enumerated in BW
3:13.2, namely where the right is exercised with no other purpose than to cause harm
to someone else; use of a right for a purpose for which it was not intended; and use of
a right that should not have occurred, had one considered the imbalance between the
interest of the person exercising the right and the interests of the person harmed by it.
See C C van Dam, F H J Mijnssen & AA van Velten Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de
Beoefening van het Burgerijk Recht 3.II Goederenrecht: Zakelijke Rechten (2002) para 46; H
J Snijders & E B Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht 4 ed (2007) para 93;WH M Reehuis
& A H T Heisterkamp with G E van Maanen & G T de Jong Pitlo Het Nederlands
Burgerlijk Recht 3 Goederenrecht 12 ed (2006) para 37. In the narrower context of abuse
of the right of ownership, regulated in BW 5:54, abuse of right refers to cases where
an owner causes harm to another by exercising his right of ownership in a way that
could be lawful in principle but is unlawful under speciﬁc circumstances, particularly
if it is exercised purely to cause harm. See Van Dam, Mijnssen & Van Velten op cit
para 37; Snijders & Rank-Berenschot op cit para 183; Reehuis & Heisterkamp with
Van Maanen & De Jong op cit para 488. The classic example is building a structure on
one’s own land purely to block the neighbour’s view: Court of Colmar 2 May 1855; a
decision also referred to by C G van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 189n163. Other
examples are HR 13 March 1936, NJ 1936, 415; HR 2April 1937, NJ 1937, 639; see
Reehuis & Heisterkamp with Van Maanen & De Jong op cit para 489. It is now
widely accepted that the doctrine simply proscribes actions undertaken purely with
the malicious intent to harm someone else. The doctrine of abuse of right forms an
important part of modern German law. The word Rechtsmißbrauch does not appear
in the civil code, but § 226 BGB (Schikanenverbot) prohibits the exercise of a right
when it can only have the purpose of causing harm for another person. In addition,
§ 242 BGB (the general good faith clause) is interpreted widely to prevent abuse of
right in various areas of the law. In the classic English case of Mayor of Bradford v Pickles
[1895] AC 587 (HL) the House of Lords decided that a lawful act of a landowner
would not be rendered unlawful merely because he exercised his rights maliciously.
However, academic commentators have pointed out that conduct which would oth-
erwise be unexceptionable might be a nuisance if it is intended purely to harm, annoy
or provoke another person. Malice might in itself not be sufﬁcient to establish nui-
sance, but it is helpful in striking the reasonableness balance between the neighbours.
See S Hedley & N Padﬁeld Tort 4 ed (2004) 206–7; M Lunney & K Oliphant Tort
Law: Text and Materials 3 ed (2008) 644–5.
44 Van der Merwe op cit note 43 at 189. See also Milton op cit note 21 at 162–5;
Van der Merwe op cit note 40 at 326–31; P J Badenhorst, J M Pienaar & H Mostert
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 117–9. For an extensive histori-
cal account see J E Scholtens ‘Abuse of rights’ (1958) 75 SALJ 39.
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harm another person. It is not entirely clear whether an otherwise lawful use
of property is always and necessarily rendered unlawful purely because of the
spiteful or otherwise malicious intent of the user, but there are indications in
case law that purely malicious use of land, without any reasonable beneﬁt for
the user, would be considered unlawful.45 Other decisions are more ﬂexible,
suggesting that malice or spite is just one factor that could render an
otherwise lawful use of land unreasonable and thus unlawful.46 Whether or
not one chooses to describe this principle in terms of the doctrine of abuse of
rights does not seem to affect the application of the principle much. It is more
important to note that the notion of abuse of rights could apply in two
different forms in the cases exempliﬁed by Allaclas, namely either if the
nuisance was caused by malicious use of the neighbouring property (which
was clearly not the case, since the use of the golf course was normal) or if the
affected neighbour maliciously insisted on vindication of her right purely to
cause harm or inconvenience for the neighbour from whose property the
nuisance arises (which was not the case either, as it was held that the level of
intrusion was unacceptably high). The doctrine of abuse of rights therefore
found no application in the Allaclas case, but it could become relevant in
other conﬂicts caused by nuisance.
II FLYING BALLS AND NUISANCE IN FOREIGN LAW
(a) Introduction
In this section I discuss a number of foreign cases on nuisance caused by stray
cricket and golf balls, focusing on the topics identiﬁed in the introductory
section. The ﬁrst question raised by these decisions is which remedy should
be made available: injunctive relief (terminating the nuisance) or damages?
The second and third questions deal with two defences often raised against
nuisance claims of this nature: coming to the nuisance (the plaintiff was the
45 Kirsch v Pincus supra note 41. The landowner planted trees, in an unusual man-
ner, along the boundary with a neighbour with the obvious intent that the trees
should shed leaves onto the malt ﬂoors of the neighbour and damage his business,
without there being any proven beneﬁt for himself or his property in doing so. The
court decided that this amounted to malicious use of property and ordered removal of
the trees. Milton op cit note 21 at 164 describes the decision as ‘irreproachable’; see
further at 267. In Union Government v Marais 1920 AD 240 the Appellate Division
argued that the English case of Mayor of Bradford v Pickles supra note 43 might have
been decided differently in South African law because of the animo vicino nocendi
principle, which underlies the doctrine of abuse of rights in Roman-Dutch law. In
Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (A) at 107G Steyn CJ explicitly
recognised the principle that an owner may not do anything on his land purely with
the spiteful intent to harm a neighbour, but in the context of the case this remark was
obiter.
46 In Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) at 1121D–1122E the court conﬁrmed that
the disposition (or subjective intention) of the respondent was relevant when decid-
ing whether her use of land was reasonable and lawful for purposes of nuisance law,
but reiterated that the test for reasonableness is objective.
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architect of her own misery because she moved in next to a cricket ﬁeld) and
the locality principle (the complaining neighbour cannot expect a higher
level of protection than is customary in the locality where the properties are
situated). The fourth issue was mentioned above as an alternative explanation
of the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in the South African Allaclas case,
namely the importance and effect of the fact that the nuisance is not a mere
annoyance but causes or poses a real and imminent threat of damage to
property or personal injury. Finally, I discuss the approach followed in
German law to cases concerning nuisance caused by objects similar to cricket
or golf balls, arguing that the German approach would reinforce the decisions
in other jurisdictions where it was held that injunctive relief is most suitable
and that it could be awarded, without relying on the reasonableness
balancing test, in cases where the nuisance causes or threatens to cause
damage to property or personal injury.
(b) Remedy: injunction or damages?
Miller v Jackson47 is the most famous English case about nuisance caused by
stray balls. The plaintiffs had bought a house that was built right next to a
quite small cricket ﬁeld on the village green. They complained that cricket
balls were regularly hit over the fence during games,48 causing damage to
their house and posing a danger of physical injury, although nobody had been
injured to date. The fact that nobody had been injured was explained by the
fact that the plaintiffs and other neighbours similarly affected chose either to
stay indoors or leave their properties during matches. The fact that these
homeowners were forced to stay indoors or leave their properties, particu-
larly on weekends during the summer, was said to prove that the danger
caused by ﬂying cricket balls made normal use and enjoyment of their homes
and gardens impossible. The cricket club had offered to pay for any damage
caused by the ﬂying cricket balls and also to install protective measures such as
a high fence, shutters and security glass for the windows, and a net that would
prevent stray balls from entering the gardens. However, the evidence showed
that the protective fence did not keep the stray balls out; the shutters and
windows would only work in so far as the plaintiffs were willing and could be
47 Supra note 27. See Buckley op cit note 36 at 334–7; S Greenﬁeld & G Osborn
‘The sanctity of the village green: Preserving Lord Denning’s pastoral vision’ (1994) 9
Denning Law Journal 53 for discussions of the case.
48 Two judges referred to the evidence on the incidence of cricket balls entering
the plaintiffs’ gardens during matches (Lord Denning MR at 341, Geoffrey Lane LJ at
346). In 1972 three and in 1974 one ball went over the fence and caused damage to
the plaintiffs’ house. A high protective fence was then erected. In 1975 six balls went
over the high protective fence; in 1976 the number was nine, three of which went
over on one day. Of these, ﬁve of the 1975 balls and two of the 1976 balls fell into the
plaintiffs’ garden, one just missing a window. Other neighbours complained of about
eight balls entering their garden in 1975 and another eight in 1976, one of which
broke a window and entered a room where a woman was sitting. Yet another couple
had about two balls entering their garden, but they have a small baby and would not
go into the garden during a match for fear that the baby might be hurt.
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expected to stay indoors over the summer weekends; and the proposed net
was found to be impracticable.
The trial court granted an injunction to stop cricket being played on the
ground and the cricket club appealed. Of the three judges who heard the
appeal, a majority (Geoffrey Lane and Cumming-Bruce LJJ, Lord Denning
MR dissenting) decided that the stray cricket balls caused an actionable
nuisance and that the club was liable for damages in negligence and
nuisance49 because there was a foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiffs and
their property from the stray cricket balls. The club could not prevent the
damage or injury as it could not reasonably expect the plaintiffs to live behind
shutters or stay out of their gardens on summer weekends.50
However, the decision that the cricket games constituted a nuisance did
not have the result for which the plaintiffs had hoped. A different majority
(Lord Denning MR and Cumming-Bruce LJ, Geoffrey Lane LJ dissenting)
overturned the trial court’s decision to grant injunctive relief, holding that
this was not an appropriate case for the granting of an injunction since the
court had to weigh the interests of both the defendant cricket club and the
public at large against those of the individual plaintiffs. This majority on the
remedy issue decided that, since an injunction is a discretionary remedy
which can only follow upon a proper weighing of the interests of all the
parties involved, it should only be granted if the public interest, including the
interests of the village, had also been considered. On balance, the majority on
the relief issue thought that the interests of the inhabitants of the village as a
whole in preserving the cricket ground for their recreation and enjoyment
should prevail over the private interest of the plaintiffs, who must have
realised when they bought their house that balls would sometimes be hit on
to their property from the adjoining cricket ground. The appeal was
therefore allowed and the injunction was set aside.51 At most, the plaintiffs
could be awarded a sum of money in damages.
This decision, and particularly the court’s refusal to grant injunctive relief,
was not generally accepted as the correct approach. In Kennaway v Thomp-
son52 the judgment in Miller v Jackson was said to be inconsistent with the
principles on the choice of remedy laid down in Shelfer,53 and consequently
the Court of Appeal refused to follow it. In cases where there is a continuing
49 The decision conﬁrmed that, while balls hit or thrown deliberately into a neigh-
bour’s garden could establish trespass, balls hit into the garden by accident from a
cricket match on neighbouring land would at most establish nuisance, if anything; see
Hedley & Padﬁeld op cit note 43 at 203. Lord Denning MR at 343 cited Letang v
Cooper [1964] 2 All ER 929 at 932 to underline the point that if the defendant does
not inﬂict injury intentionally, but causes damage or injury by accident, the plaintiff
has no cause of action in trespass; his only cause of action is in negligence, for which it
has to be proven that he did not exercise reasonable care.
50 Miller v Jackson supra note 27 at 347, 348, 349.
51 Ibid at 345, 350, 351.
52 [1980] 3All ER 329.
53 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287.
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actionable nuisance the court’s jurisdiction to award damages instead of an
injunction is to be exercised very sparingly and then the public interest
cannot prevail over the private interest.54 In Watson v Croft Promo-Sport Ltd55
the Court of Appeal again conﬁrmed, in a nuisance case involving noise
caused by a car race track, that ‘damages in lieu of an injunction should only
be awarded under very exceptional circumstances’. The court repeated what
was said in Jaggard v Sawyer,56 namely ‘that the test is one of oppression, and
the court should not slide into application of a general balance of conve-
nience test’. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal decided,57 the effect on the
public of the grant of an injunction can be taken into account in a marginal
case where the damage caused to the claimant is minimal, but the public
beneﬁt cannot on its own ‘negate the requirement of exceptional circum-
stances or oppression of the defendant which both Shelfer and Jaggard clearly
require’. Unless the effect of the nuisance on the plaintiff is so small as to
render it marginal, the court should not ‘let in consideration of the public
interest.’ Given the court’s decision in Miller v Jackson that the threat of
damage and injury was in fact serious, it could therefore be argued that an
injunction was the most suitable remedy in that case after all. The reading of
the Shelfer and Jaggard decisions that was preferred in Kennaway and in Watson
suggests that injunctive relief is the correct remedy in any case where the
nuisance causes or threatens to cause serious damage, which strengthens the
argument that it should be the only possible remedy in cases where the
nuisance causes or threatens to cause personal injury.
In the Australian case of Campbelltown Golf Club Limited v Winton58 the
Supreme Court of Appeal of New South Wales conﬁrmed that injunctive
relief is indeed the most suitable remedy in cases where nuisance caused by
stray balls threatens to cause damage to property or personal injury. The facts
were very similar to those in the South African Allaclas case. The plaintiffs,
who had built a house right next to a golf course, complained about the stray
golf balls that ended up in their property, damaging the house and once
striking an infant child.59 The trial court had awarded damages in nuisance
and the defendants appealed in an attempt to have the amount of damages
reduced. The Supreme Court of New South Wales dismissed the appeal and
54 E McKendrick ‘Trespass to airspace and property development’ (1988) 138 New
LJ 23; E Grayson ‘Sporting legal lotteries’ (1994) 144 New LJ 788.
55 [2009] EWCA Civ 15 (CA) para 27, referring to Shelfer v City of London Electric
Lighting Co supra note 53; Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 262, 278, 286, 288; Regan v
Paul Properties [2007] Ch 135 paras 35–7.
56 [1995] 1WLR 262 at 283.
57 Watson v Croft Promo-Sport Ltd supra note 55 para 51.
58 Supra note 25. This decision was referred to with approval in Allaclas (SCA)
supra note 12 paras 16–17.
59 The evidence indicated that between 1 January 1995 and 17 May 1995 at least
421 balls landed in the plaintiff’s property; on 16 May 1995 at least 1262 balls had been
collected in total.
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set out its view of the relationship between owners of a golf course and
neighbouring residents:
‘What was required was that the golf course should so adjust its activities as not
to interfere unreasonably with the peaceful enjoyment by residents of their
land. At the same time, the residents, bordering as they did a golf course, had to
accept the fact that the game of golf was going to be played on land adjoining
their properties and that it could be expected that from time to time some golf
balls might come on to their land. But what they were not bound to accept was
a situation such as was suffered by the respondents in which their property was
peppered with golf balls on a daily basis, thus posing a threat, not only to the
respondents’ property but also to their physical safety. The golf course was
obliged so to construct the hole as to divert balls hit normally away from their
property. This could be done by resiting the direction of the hole or by
appropriate screens, whether natural or artiﬁcial, or a combination of both as
indeed has apparently happened.’60
The court conﬁrmed that the owners and operators of the golf course had
to ensure that its use would not cause unreasonable interference with the
neighbouring landowners’use and enjoyment of their land.61 If the owners of
the golf course failed to honour this obligation and the playing of golf caused
a nuisance, the affected neighbours might be entitled to injunctive relief.
In the Canadian case of Lakeview Gardens Ltd v City of Regina62 the Queen’s
Bench, Judicial Centre of Regina, granted both an injunction and damages
to the plaintiff on the basis of a private nuisance caused by golf balls that are
hit onto the plaintiff’s land on a regular basis. Complaints had been lodged
with the golf course over a number of years.63 The court held that, as long as
the golf course was operated next to the plaintiff’s property, it would be a
nuisance which interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of its
60 Campbelltown Golf Club Limited v Winton CA supra note 25. The electronic
report is neither paginated nor paragraphed.
61 Virtually the same approach was followed by the Supreme Court of Victoria in
Champagne View Pty Ltd v Shearwater Resort Management Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 214
(25 May 2000), although the owners of the golf course in this case had taken the
necessary steps to prevent further infringements before the trial commenced and the
only remaining issue was costs. The court held that the plaintiffs had a good chance to
succeed on the merits and were therefore entitled to their costs. In Challen v McLeod
Country Golf Club [2004] QDC 24 (27 February 2004) the District Court of Queen-
sland dismissed a very similar claim because it was decided that the golf course had
responded reasonably to earlier complaints by moving the tee, but that later com-
plaints were not brought to its attention clearly enough to establish fault through
inaction. See on this decision J Woodgate ‘Golf balls — a nuisance?’ Mullins Sport:
Newsletter of Mullins Lawyers Issue Number 18, May 2004 at 2.
62 2003 SKQB 234 para 9.
63 In the decision on appeal the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan provided more
facts than the trial court did: City of Regina v Lakeview Gardens 2004 SKCA110 para 4.
Between ten and twenty golf balls are found on the plaintiff’s land every year. The
claim for damages was for glass broken once or twice. Nobody had been hit by a stray
golf ball, but there was at least one close miss.
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property.64 The plaintiff was not asking that the golf course should be shut
down, but rather that reasonable steps should be taken to restrain golfers from
hitting golf balls onto the plaintiff’s land. The court granted a permanent
injunction that a course monitor should be appointed to prevent the
nuisance, and granted a small amount of compensation for damage previously
caused by stray golf balls.65 The Court ofAppeal for Saskatchewan conﬁrmed
that the basis for liability in this particular case was nuisance, not trespass,
because the intrusions were indirect and caused by accident rather than
design.66 The issue in nuisance was
‘whether the errant balls, some 10 to 20 per year, which have caused four or ﬁve
glass breakages, over ten years, but have not struck anyone or otherwise caused
any personal injury are a substantial and unreasonable interference with the
respondent’s use of its property or whether they are merely inconvenient or a
minor discomfort’.67
In the majority of earlier cases, the court noted, there was evidence of
signiﬁcant damage or of a threat of damage to property or personal injury.68
However, the plaintiff in this case was not affected nearly as badly as any of
the plaintiffs in the earlier cases. Citing the English decision in Bolton v
Stone,69 the Court of Appeal decided that the trial court had erred and that
there was not nearly enough evidence in this case to substantiate a nuisance
claim for injunctive relief:
‘[I]t cannot be said that persons on the respondent’s property face anything
other than a very remote risk of injury. As for property damage, four or ﬁve
instances of broken windows over a ten year period is hardly unusual for a
business of which a major component is greenhouses. The balls emanating from
the golf course could not be characterized as anything more than an inconve-
64 Para 10.
65 The evidence suggested that golf balls could only land on the plaintiff’s land if
they were hit there deliberately: City of Regina v Lakeview Gardens supra note 63 para
6. The course monitor was therefore considered a suitable remedy. The defendant
had planted trees at considerable expense to screen the plaintiff’s property from errant
balls.
66 Ibid para 13. The court explained that the difference between trespass and nui-
sance was based on the distinction between intrusions directly and deliberately
infringing upon neighbouring land (trespass, for which there is liability without proof
of harm) and indirect or consequential intrusions (nuisance, for which liability
depends on proof of harm unreasonably caused).
67 Ibid para 15.
68 Ibid para 16, citing Carley v Willow Park Golf Course Ltd [2003] 2 WWR 659
(Alta QB) (unable to use their yard, 30 balls in one ten-day period, 174 balls, 88 balls
and 176 balls in one-year periods); Douglas Lake Cattle Co v Mount Paul Golf Course
(SPM) Inc 2001 BCSC 566, [2001] BCJ No 894 (QL) (2577 balls in a period of one
year and ﬁve days, frequent damage to equipment and narrowly missing employees
and customers); Segal v Derrick Golf & Winter Club (1977) 76 DLR (3d) 746 (Alta SC
(TD)) (over 200 balls in one year, yard unusable for family and children); Transcona
Country Club v Transcona Golf Club 2002 MBQB 113 [2002] MJ No 163 (QL) (build-
ing hit on a daily basis).
69 [1951] 1All ER 1078 (HL). See note 114 below and accompanying text.
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nience or a minor discomfort. The risk of either property damage, or personal
injury was neither substantial nor unreasonable.’70
The injunction granted by the trial court was therefore overturned, but
the defendant was liable in negligence in so far as it had failed to prevent
further damage or injury after the plaintiff had complained about stray golf
balls breaking glass and the order for damages was conﬁrmed.71 In Tanglewood
(Sierra Homes) Inc v Munro Golf Ltd72 the plaintiff, who was developing a
housing estate next to the golf course operated by the defendant, became
concerned about the stray golf balls landing on his property and, when an
initial agreement to solve the problem inter partes failed, applied for an
injunction to restrain further playing of golf on the golf course, pending trial
to resolve all issues between the parties. The Ontario Superior Court of
Justice conﬁrmed that stray golf balls from a golf course cause a nuisance that
can be enjoined by an injunction73 but dismissed the application for an
interlocutory injunction because, although the plaintiff had shown that there
was a serious case to decide on trial, the plaintiff had failed to show irreparable
harm, while the closing of even just one hole of the golf course would have a
serious detrimental effect on the defendant. Failure to obtain injunctive relief
in this case should not be seen as an indication that the court applied the
reasonableness test; the decision should be understood in view of the speciﬁc
requirements for interlocutory relief. The signiﬁcant point in these two cases
is that injunctive relief was denied because of inadequate proof of a
signiﬁcant and real threat and not because the intrusion was regarded as
reasonable.
In Sammut v Islington Golf Club Ltd74 the damage caused and the danger
posed by ﬂying golf balls was much more serious. The plaintiffs claimed
injunctive relief to restrain the golf club from permitting its members to play
golf on the third hole until a redesign and landscaping of that hole have been
completed to abate the nuisance of golf balls landing on, hitting or traversing
the plaintiffs’ property. They also asked for a mandatory order requiring the
golf course to redesign and landscape its third hole and claimed damages for
nuisance, negligence and trespass.75 Apart from damage to their property, the
plaintiffs were unable to use their garden for fear of ﬂying golf balls.
Remedial steps taken by the golf course, including the planting of trees and
fencing, did not solve the problem. The court decided that the golf club,
having become aware of the problem, owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs to
take the necessary steps to eliminate the problem effectively and that it had
70 City of Regina v Lakeview Gardens (A) supra note 63 para 21.
71 Ibid para 22, again with reference to Bolton v Stone supra note 69.
72 [2009] OJ No 1750.
73 Citing Sammut v Islington Golf Club Ltd [2005] OJ No 2674; Segal v Derrick Golf
& Winter Club supra note 68; Douglas Lake Cattle Co v Mount Paul Golf Course supra
note 68.
74 Supra note 73.
75 The court dismissed the claim based on trespass for lack of evidence: Sammut v
Islington Golf Club Ltd ibid paras 16–17.
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failed to do so. This failure has caused damage to the plaintiffs’ property,
created a continuing potential hazard for their safety and made it impossible
for them to enjoy their property.76 The stray golf balls constituted a private
nuisance and the defendants were ordered to pay damages and to take the
necessary steps to prevent its members from hitting golf balls onto or over the
plaintiffs’ property in future.77
By way of contrast, the decision in Cattel v Great Plains Leaseholds Ltd78
resembles the English decision in Miller v Jackson79 rather than the other
Canadian cases discussed above. The trial court had found that golf balls
ﬂying onto property owned by the plaintiffs from the golf course operated by
the defendants created a nuisance, granted damages and enjoined the
defendants from allowing its members and guests to hit golf balls on the ninth
hole of the course so that they would land in the plaintiffs’ property. On
appeal the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decided that the trial court’s
ﬁnding of negligence was unreasonable and not supported by the facts80 and
that, although the defendants were liable in nuisance, the scope of the
injunction was overbroad. The steps the golf club would have had to take to
abide by the injunction would have had the effect that ‘recreational play is
inconvenienced, and tournament play is all but precluded, at least at the
championship level’.81 The question was whether the injunction, ‘with its
absolute and inviolable mandate’, its ‘very breadth and excessive reach’,
worked an unfair result that is objectionable in law. In the court’s view, the
injunction ‘is uncomfortably at odds with the notions of ‘‘give and take’’ that
temper the law of nuisance’.82 In the spirit of the English decision in Miller v
Jackson,83 the court decided that the injunction granted by the trial judge was
overbroad in light of the plaintiffs’ acknowledged expectation that stray golf
balls would occasionally inconvenience them. The order of the trial court
was overturned because the court had failed to balance interests, to weigh the
social beneﬁts of the golf club against the private interests of the plaintiffs in
the quiet enjoyment of their property. The goal in cases like this, the Court of
Appeal held, was ‘to moderate the conﬂicting claims of landowners, each
76 Ibid para 19.
77 The method for attaining this goal was left open and the defendants were given
two weeks to comply. They chose to erect a high chain link fence across the plaintiffs’
land in a way the court described as a great inconvenience to the plaintiffs and a
serious eyesore for them and anyone else. In addition, it restricted the plaintiffs’ access
to a public highway, created another private and public nuisance and invited further
litigation. The defendants were expected to select a reasonable solution that would
make matters better for the plaintiffs, not worse, and therefore they were ordered to
remove the fence and implement a more reasonable solution. See Sammut v Islington
Golf Club Ltd supra note 73 para 5.
78 [2008] SJ No 347.
79 Supra note 27.
80 Cattel v Great Plains Leaseholds Ltd supra note 78 paras 26–30.
81 Ibid para 15.
82 Ibid para 19.
83 Supra note 27.
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desiring the maximum enjoyment of their property, and to accomplish this
without unduly subordinating the interests of one owner to the comfort of
the other’.84 Legal intervention is warranted only ‘when an excessive use of
property causes inconvenience beyond what other occupiers in the vicinity can be
expected to bear, having regard to the prevailing standard of comfort of the
time and place’.85 The terms of the injunction were therefore amended to
make it possible for the golf course to operate, albeit under non-ideal
circumstances, while respecting the rights of the plaintiffs. Like the English
case of Miller v Jackson, this decision focused on balancing the interests of the
parties, in other words the ‘normal’ nuisance principle of reasonableness,
instead of granting injunctive relief purely because of the threat of damage or
injury. The two decisions therefore go against the trend established in the rest
of the case law on this issue.
(c) Coming to the nuisance
The second issue is whether coming to the nuisance is a complete defence in
nuisance cases. In Miller v Jackson86 the only strong argument that the
defendant raised against injunctive relief was that the plaintiffs had ‘come to
the nuisance’. A majority (Geoffrey Lane and Cumming-Bruce LJJ, Lord
Denning MR dissenting) held that the club’s use of the cricket ground
amounted to an actionable nuisance and that it was no defence that the
plaintiffs had been the authors of their own misfortune by buying a house so
close to the ground that they would inevitably be affected by the cricket.87 A
majority of the court thus conﬁrmed the principle, albeit reluctantly, that
coming to the nuisance was not a complete defence against a claim in
nuisance or negligence.88 Lord Denning MR disagreed with the majority on
84 Cattel v Great Plains Leaseholds Ltd supra note 78 para 20.
85 Ibid para 22 (emphasis in the original).
86 Supra note 27.
87 Ibid at 348, 349; applying Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852.
88 The principle was established in Sturges v Bridgman supra note 87; see further
Kennaway v Thompson supra note 52. See further Lunney & Oliphant op cit note 43 at
668; R Kidner Casebook on Torts 5 ed (1990) 383. J Pugh-Smith, G Sinclair & W
Upton Neighbours and the Law 4 ed (2006) note that a duty to fence may arise in
negligence to prevent foreseeable escapes, eg in sporting activities, depending on the
frequency of the occurrence and the cost of preventing it. In Dutch law there are
some indications that priority in time will establish a stronger right to use property in a
certain way, but it is not clear that coming to the nuisance will be an absolute defence
in a nuisance claim; see Van Dam, Mijnssen & Van Velten op cit note 43 para 41;
Snijders & Rank-Berenschot op cit note 43 para 183; Reehuis & Heisterkamp with
Van Maanen & De Jong op cit note 43 para 487, citing HR 3 May 1991, NJ 1991,
476; HR 18 September 1998, NJ 1998, 69. In German law the priority principle also
applies, but only in considering reasonableness and not as an absolute defence: H
Prütting Sachenrecht 33 ed (2008) 125; H Westermann, HPWestermann, K H Gursky
& D Eickmann Westermann Sachenrecht: Ein Lehrbuch 7 ed (1998) 502. M Wolff & M
Wellenhofer Sachenrecht 24 ed (2008) 378; BGH NJW 2001, 3119. As is pointed out
in the penultimate section below, the matter is steered in a different direction by other
considerations that apply in German law.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL292
this point, arguing that coming to the nuisance was indeed relevant and that
it should affect the outcome of the case: the ﬁrst user in time should enjoy
priority over the interests of those who came to the area later and whose use
and enjoyment of their property conﬂict with the prior use.89 Buckley90 has
pointed out that, even though the majority accepted the authority of the
decision in Sturges v Bridgman91 and held that coming to the nuisance was not
a complete defence, the notion of coming to the nuisance nevertheless had
an impact on the decision in that it resulted in the plaintiffs being deprived of
the injunctive relief that they should have been entitled to in terms of the
established authority of the decision in Shelfer.92
In the Australian case of Campbelltown Golf Club Limited v Winton93 the
Supreme Court of New South Wales conﬁrmed that coming to the nuisance
was not a complete defence in nuisance cases,94 adding that it was not a
defence that could be used to reduce the amount of damages either. ‘The
problem with the appellant’s submission’, the court stated,
‘is that it endeavours to relegate houses built on land in the subdivision to an
inferior position to that occupied by the golf course. In the appellant’s
submission, the golf course was the focal point. If it created a problem for
89 Miller v Jackson supra note 27 at 342, 344. Lord Denning at 344–5 would have
adopted the principle that coming to the nuisance was a complete defence in this case
because the use of the village commons for cricket matches was a reasonable use and
because it could not be rendered unreasonable or a nuisance simply because the
plaintiffs built a house right next to it. If anybody had to move to solve the problem,
he thought it should be the plaintiffs. At 345 Lord Denning MR went as far as to
argue that the plaintiff should leave if he could not accept the situation: ‘If he ﬁnds
that he does not like it, he ought, when cricket is played, to sit in the other side of the
house or in the front garden, or go out; or take advantage of the offers the club have
made to him of ﬁtting unbreakable glass, and so forth. Or, if he does not like that, he
ought to sell his house and move elsewhere. I expect there are many who would
gladly buy it in order to be near the cricket ﬁeld and open space. At any rate he ought
not to be allowed to stop cricket being played on this ground.’ Geoffrey Lane LJ at
348–9 would, if the matter was open for decision, have preferred not to stop ‘a
long-established activity, in itself innocuous, . . . because someone chooses to build a
house nearby and so turn an innocent pastime into an actionable nuisance’. However,
he was bound by the authority of the decision in Sturges v Bridgman. Cumming-Bruce
LJ at 349 agreed with that conclusion, although at 351 it looks as if he came perilously
close to in fact accepting a defence on the basis of coming to the nuisance, at least as
far as the decision on the correct remedy is concerned: ‘[T]he plaintiffs having
accepted the beneﬁt of the open space marching with their land should accept the
restrictions on enjoyment of their garden which they may reasonably think neces-
sary.’
90 Buckley op cit note 36 at 336.
91 Supra note 87.
92 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co supra note 53; see the discussion
above.
93 Supra note 25. This decision was referred to with approval in Allaclas (SCA)
supra note 12 paras 16–17.
94 Citing Attorney-General v Corporation of Manchester [1893] 2 Ch D 87 at 95;
Sturges v Bridgman supra note 87.
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residents, that was something which the residents had to tolerate. That is not
the law’.95
In Sammut v Islington Golf Club Ltd96 the Canadian court also rejected the
notion of coming to the nuisance as a complete defence in nuisance cases.
The plaintiffs built their house and moved there long after the golf course had
been built and started functioning as such. The golf club had always opposed
the building of the houses and was not surprised when the plaintiffs’ house
was hit by hundreds of golf balls per week during the golf season. The court
rejected the argument that the plaintiffs could not complain because they had
come to the nuisance — even in so far as they had consented to some
discomfort by building and living in a house in that location, there is no
reason to conclude ‘that they have ever consented to endure a problem of
this nature or magnitude’.97
In Nussbaum v Lacopo98 the New York state court said that ‘one who
chooses to reside on property abutting a golf course is not entitled to the same
protection as the traveler on the public highway’, which could create the
impression that coming to the nuisance is accepted as a defence in nuisance
cases. Generally speaking, however, the doctrine of coming to the nuisance
does not provide a complete defence against a nuisance claim in US law.99 In
Rinaldo v McGovern100 the New York Court of Appeals explained that the
statement in Nussbaum v Lacopo does not imply that individuals outside of the
golf course who are struck by stray balls as they travel on the highway are
entitled to special protection either. In US law liability for damage or injury
caused by stray balls depends on the general principles of liability in tort.
In foreign law the principle is therefore established that coming to the
nuisance does not provide a complete defence in any nuisance case. In cases
where the nuisance causes or threatens to cause damage to property or
personal injury this principle should be even stronger.
(d) The locality principle
In Miller v Jackson101 the majority decided not to grant an injunction because
of the public interest in continuing the use of the green as a cricket ﬁeld. The
court therefore paid special attention to the public interest in applying the
balancing test that is supposed to indicate whether the defendant’s use of its
property was reasonable. As was indicated above, the decision not to grant
injunctive relief was inﬂuenced by the view that the interests of the public in
95 Campbelltown Golf Club Limited v Winton CA supra note 25. The electronic
report is neither paginated nor paragraphed.
96 Supra note 73.
97 Ibid para 23.
98 27 NY2d 311 at 316 (1970).
99 RA Epstein Torts (1999) 365–6; A Best & D W Barnes Basic Tort law: Cases,
Statutes, and Problems (2003) 769, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840D; Lawrence v
Eastern Airlines Inc 81 So 2d 632 at 634 (Fla 1955).
100 78 NY2d 729 (1991).
101 Supra note 27.
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preserving the long-established use of the green as a cricket ground had to
prevail over the individual interests of the plaintiffs. As far as the majority on
this issue was concerned this was an application of the locality principle,
although Lord Denning MR in his individual judgment declared explicitly
that he saw the fact that the plaintiffs had come to the nuisance as a valid
defence against the nuisance claim.
The locality principle means that a land user cannot expect a higher level
of comfort than is usual or customary in the locality where the property is
situated. In the decision of the majority in Miller v Jackson this meant that the
owners who built or moved into houses that are close to a cricket ground
cannot expect to enjoy the use of their properties completely free of
occasional intrusions by stray cricket balls. Obviously this principle bears
some relation to the notion of coming to the nuisance, but in the form of the
locality principle it is nothing more than a factor that will play a role in
weighing up the conﬂicting interests in the context, whereas it is seen as a
complete defence according to the notion of coming to the nuisance.
Buckley102 points out that the refusal of injunctive relief in Miller v Jackson
was justiﬁed with reference to the principle that a plaintiff in a nuisance case
is not entitled to a higher standard than is customary in the particular locality
— in this case, the dominating use of the locality was the playing of cricket
and thus the plaintiffs could not obtain a higher standard of protection than is
allowed by that custom. The same argument has been used elsewhere as a
weaker version of the defence of coming to the nuisance.
However, the matter is more complicated than it may seem from the
decision in Miller v Jackson. In the Australian case of Campbelltown Golf Club
Limited v Winton103 the court applied the locality principle differently by
pointing out that the occupiers of land bordering a golf course had to expect
that some golf balls might come on to their land from time to time, but that
they did not have to accept that their property would be ‘peppered with golf
balls on a daily basis’ in a way that posed a threat to their property and their
physical safety. The golf course was obliged to accommodate their interests
and safety by adapting its operations in a suitable way. The locality principle
therefore does not mean that the affected neighbours simply had to put up
with whatever level of nuisance is usual or customary in their area; they had
to tolerate the effects of normal or customary use in their area only in so far as
it is reasonable.
In the Canadian case of Cattel v Great Plains Leaseholds Ltd104 the plaintiffs
had built houses or moved into existing houses next to the golf course; both
acknowledged that they fully expected that some stray golf balls would land
on their property. ‘It is trite logic’, the court pointed out, ‘that inconvenience
102 Buckley op cit note 36 at 336.
103 Supra note 25. This decision was referred to with approval in Allaclas (SCA)
supra note 12 paras 16–17.
104 Supra note 78.
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of that nature is part and parcel of the ‘‘golf community lifestyle’’ ’.105 The
problem is, as the court wittily noted, that in this area of the law ‘there is no
bright line signifying the point where sport becomes tort’.106 The
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that the injunction granted by the trial
court was overbroad because the court failed to weigh the social beneﬁts of
the golf club against the private interests of the plaintiffs in the quiet
enjoyment of their property.107 The goal in cases like this, the court held, was
to balance the conﬂicting claims of landowners without subordinating the
interests of one owner to the comfort of the other, taking into account the
level of inconvenience that occupiers in the vicinity can be expected to
bear.108 The terms of the injunction were therefore amended to make it
possible for the golf course to operate while respecting the rights of the
plaintiffs. This decision seems to go in the same general direction as the
English decision in Miller v Jackson in the sense that the court did not simply
award injunctive relief because of the danger that the nuisance might cause
damage or injury, but instead employed the reasonableness test (including the
locality principle) to balance the conﬂicting interests of the parties. It thus
went against the trend of the other decisions in which the locality principle
was not applied because of the danger of damage or injury. At the same time
this decision did not go quite as far as Miller v Jackson in that it still awarded
injunctive relief, but structured the order to allow the defendant to continue
to operate.
The decisions in Miller v Jackson and Cattell are problematic in the sense
that they arguably gave too much prominence to the locality principle in
cases where the nuisance went beyond merely causing a discomfort or
disturbance. In the latter cases the locality principle is subject to a signiﬁcant
proviso, as the next section will show.
(e) Danger of damage or injury
In Miller v Jackson109 Geoffrey Lane LJ thought that the rule in Sturges v
Bridgman against the notion of coming to the nuisance worked an injustice in
this case, but he was nevertheless the only judge who was willing to grant
injunctive relief to suspend the playing of cricket on the village green because
of the danger that it posed for the plaintiffs. There was no question, he
decided, that property would be damaged and that someone might suffer
injury at some point if the cricket games continued. The defendants would
be liable in negligence and in nuisance if that should happen.110 Geoffrey
Lane LJ distinguished between nuisance to the senses (such as noise) and
nuisance that poses a real and serious threat of physical damage or personal
105 Ibid para 11.
106 Ibid para 12.
107 Ibid para 20.
108 Ibid para 22. See the discussion of this case above.
109 Supra note 27.
110 Miller v Jackson ibid at 348.
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injury. In the latter case, he argued, ‘the answer is more simple’ — the
balancing of the interests of the plaintiffs on the one hand and of the
defendants and the public at large on the other becomes more straightfor-
ward because there is a real and obvious risk that property may be physically
damaged and that people might suffer serious injury. In such cases, the judge
declared, there is ‘no excuse I can see which exonerates the defendants from
liability in nuisance for what they have done or from what they threaten to
do’.111 Given the unavailability of a defence based on coming to the
nuisance, the threat of damage or injury had to be avoided, and the only way
of doing so was to grant an injunction to stop the club from playing cricket
on the green.112 This judgment demonstrates the alternative interpretation
referred to in the introduction: when the nuisance causes or threatens to
cause damage to property or personal injury the normal neighbour law
procedure of weighing and balancing the interests of neighbours is suspended
and injunctive relief is granted. In other words, the actual threat of damage or
injury indicates that balancing is unnecessary because there is no level at
which neighbours are expected to tolerate damage or injury.
Buckley shows that the defence based on the locality principle has always
been subject to the same qualiﬁcation: the locality principle applies to
nuisance causing interference with comfort and enjoyment of property, but it
has never been allowed when there was damage to property.113 Neither the
defence of coming to the nuisance nor the defence of locality should
therefore be available or considered in cases where the nuisance threatens or
causes damage or injury. According to this qualiﬁcation, Miller v Jackson was
wrongly decided and the injunction should have been upheld. The decision
in Cattel might still be justiﬁable despite this qualiﬁcation, in so far as the
court in Cattel did not deny injunctive relief altogether but structured the
order so to allow the defendant to do business while protecting the plaintiff
against damage or injury.
The high incidence of stray balls ﬂying into the property of the plaintiffs
and the likelihood that physical damage and serious injury would be caused
by them distinguish Miller v Jackson from Bolton v Stone,114 where the House
of Lords allowed the appeal and restored the trial court judgment that
nuisance was not proved because negligence could not be established. In
Bolton v Stone, the court decided on the facts that the low frequency of cricket
balls being hit out of the ground, combined with the fact that the street on
111 Ibid.
112 Because of his sympathy for the cricketers, he was willing to suspend the injunc-
tion for twelve months to allow the club time to look for an alternative pitch.
113 Buckley op cit note 36 at 336.
114 Supra note 69. See Greenﬁeld & Osborn op cit note 47 at 53 for a discussion.
Another case where a stray ball caused personal injury is Castle v Augustine’s Links Ltd
(1922) 38 TLR 615; a taxi-cab driver lost an eye when a badly hit golf ball hit him in
the eye while driving on the road adjoining a golf course. The court held that public
nuisance was established and Castle was awarded damages. See RABuckley The Law
of Nuisance (1981) 59–60 on both Bolton v Stone and Castle v Augustine’s Links.
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which the plaintiff was hit by a stray cricket ball was not frequented by
pedestrians, indicated that injury caused by stray balls was improbable. The
principle is that one must take reasonable care to avoid an occurrence that is
not just remotely possible but reasonably likely in the sense that the
reasonable person would contemplate it as a probability. In Bolton v Stone the
House of Lords said that if cricket cannot be played on a ground without
creating a substantial risk, then it should not be played there at all,115 but on
the facts the risk of injury to a person was remote and therefore the
defendants were not guilty of creating a nuisance.116 In cases where the
nuisance threatens or causes damage or injury the courts should therefore
focus on evidence concerning the incidence and the manner of immission,
not in order to determine the level where neighbourly tolerance is exceeded
but to assess the risk of actual damage or injury. The appeal decision in
Lakeview Gardens Ltd v City of Regina117 can be explained on the same basis,
namely that the incidence of dangerous stray golf balls was too low to create a
real threat.
It is also clear from the Australian decision in Campbelltown Golf Club
Limited v Winton118 that the threat of damage to property and physical injury
places a stricter duty of care upon the owners and operators of the golf course
to ensure that their activities would not establish a nuisance for adjoining
landowners. The threat of damage or injury cancels out the neighbour’s
obligation within reason to tolerate intrusions caused by stray golf balls.
In US law the question of liability is decided on the basis of the normal
principles of tort law, particularly the duty of care. It has been decided by the
NewYork Court ofAppeals that a golfer preparing to drive a ball has no duty
to warn persons ‘not in the intended line of ﬂight on another tee or
fairway’.119Apart from the duty to other players on the golf course, a golfer is
ordinarily not held liable for damage or injury to persons located outside of
the boundaries of the golf course who happen to be hit by a stray ball.120 In
Rinaldo v McGovern121 the New York Court of Appeals decided that the
statement in Nussbaum v Lacopo122 that ‘one who chooses to reside on
property abutting a golf course is not entitled to the same protection as the
traveler on the public highway’ does not imply that individuals outside of the
115 Bolton v Stone supra note 69. In Miller v Jackson supra note 27 at 342 Lord
Denning MR referred to this statement, but accepted it only in so far as the plaintiff
was not coming to the nuisance.
116 The only facts to be proven in the case established that about six balls had been
hit into the street over a period of thirty years. This makes the incidence of stray balls a
very infrequent occurrence, to which must be added the small likelihood that a stray
ball would actually hit a pedestrian on a not very busy street.
117 Supra note 63 para 9.
118 Supra note 25. This decision was referred to with approval in Allaclas (SCA)
supra note 12 paras 16–17.
119 Jenks v McGranahan 30 NY2d 475 at 479 (1972).
120 Nussbaum v Lacopo supra note 98.
121 78 NY2d 729 (1991).
122 Supra note 98.
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golf course who are struck by stray balls as they travel on the highway are
entitled to special protection.123 The issue in Rinaldo v McGovern was
whether the golfer had a duty to warn persons outside of the golf course, and
the court held that she did not, as such a warning would be either futile or
impossible. The court conﬁrmed the decision in Jenks v McGranaghan124 that
the risk of a mis-hit golf ball is not a preventable occurrence and that there
was no liability in tort unless ‘the harm ﬂowing from the consummation of
that risk was reasonably preventable’. To establish liability the plaintiff would
have to prove that the golfer failed to exercise due care, for instance by
showing that the golfer ‘aimed so inaccurately as to unreasonably increase the
risk of harm’.125
By contrast, the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Cattel v
Great Plains Leaseholds Ltd126 seems to go in the opposite direction, more
closely resembling the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Miller v
Jackson127 in its effort to establish a fair balance of the interests of the
conﬂicting owners and of the public. Both Miller and Cattel raise the question
how far a court could go in accommodating the interests of the owners of
sporting facilities (or the public interest) as against the interest of those
threatened with damage to their property or personal injury. In the Allaclas
case the question also arose whether the court should suspend the injunction
to give the owners of the golf club time to ﬁnd an alternative solution, but
the Supreme Court of Appeal refused to do so. In that regard the contrast
between the Allaclas decision and the other recent South African nuisance
case, Laskey v Showzone CC,128 is instructive. In Laskey, a noise case, the
court went out of its way to suspend the injunction to give the owner of the
offending property an opportunity to rectify the situation without damaging
its business. Apparently, this was not possible in Allaclas because of the threat
that continuation of normal golf activities could cause damage to property or
personal injury. The difference between the two cases seems to be the
difference between nuisance in the form of annoyance or discomfort and
nuisance that causes or threatens to cause damage to property or personal
injury. In the former case the courts can be lenient to protect the interests of
the defendant; in the latter there is apparently less room for lenience.
123 In US law the doctrine of coming to the nuisance does not provide a general
defence against a nuisance claim: Epstein op cit note 99 at 365–6; Best & Barnes op cit
note 99 at 769, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840D; Lawrence v Eastern Airlines
Inc 81 So 2d 632 at 634 (Fla 1955).
124 Supra note 119.
125 Citing Nussbaum v Lacopo supra note 98.
126 Supra note 78.
127 [1977] 3 All ER 338. See Buckley op cit note 36 at 334; Greenﬁeld & Osborn
op cit note 47 at 53 for discussions of the case.
128 Supra note 33.
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(f) German law: an alternative approach129
Apart from a famous case on noise caused by the unfortunate placing of a
tennis court,130 I could not ﬁnd any German case law on ﬂying balls causing
nuisance. Of course the Germans do not play cricket much, but even golf
balls seem to cause less of a problem in case law. There is a special reason for
this seemingly strange absence of case law on nuisance caused by stray balls.
The German civil code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) does not deﬁne
nuisance. The general background provision in § 1004 BGB allows land-
owners a remedy to demand that impositions upon or interferences with
their property should be removed or terminated (similar remedies are
provided for other land users in other paragraphs of the code). Nuisance is
regulated by a qualiﬁcation of this general principle in § 906 BGB, which
provides that the owner of land cannot prevent the spreading of gasses, steam,
smells, smoke, soot, heat, noise, vibrations and similar immissions from
neighbouring land in so far as they do not (at all or signiﬁcantly) affect the use
of his land negatively. Negative effects are considered insigniﬁcant when they
do not exceed limits or guidelines laid down in legislation or administrative
rules or when the effect of the immission is insigniﬁcant or, in cases where its
effect is signiﬁcant, when the immission is caused by use of the neighbouring
land that is normal in the area and prevention of the immission would be
economically unreasonable.
Most importantly for present purposes, § 906 BGB, which qualiﬁes the
right in § 1004 BGB to have interferences with ownership terminated,
explicitly excludes materials that can be weighed (wägbare Stoffe)131 — if
larger, weighable bodies entered upon neighbouring land § 906 BGB would
129 Information for this section was mostly adapted from sections from ch 6 (Nui-
sance) ofA J van derWalt The Law of Neighbours (forthcoming, 2010).
130 In the Tennisplatz case (NJW 1983, 751) the German Federal Court in Civil
Matters (Bundesgerichtshof: BGH) granted a complete prohibition order against
playing of tennis on courts in close proximity to the residential property of the
plaintiff. The matter was subsequently regulated by a specially promulgated regula-
tion under the federal nuisance protection law (Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz
14.5.1990, BGBl I 881), that regulates protection against noise from sport facilities.
SeeWestermann,Westermann, Gursky & Eickmann supra note 88 at 504–5.
131 The category of large or weighable materials excluded from the duty of toler-
ance imposed by § 609 BGB would include ﬂying stone or brick chips and large
animals like pigeons, chickens, cats and rabbits, but bees have been included as light
(unweighable) objects: Westermann, Westermann, Gursky & Eickmann op cit note
88 at 498. Dutch law functions slightly differently, but it would include bees and large
numbers of birds as objects that could cause actionable nuisance, while in some cases
excluding pigeons: Snijders & Rank-Berenschot op cit note 43 para 183; Van Dam,
Mijnssen & Van Velten op cit note 43 para 37; Reehuis & Heisterkamp with Van
Maanen & De Jong op cit note 43 para 486. It is important to distinguish nuisance
caused by invasion of the animals themselves from nuisance caused by noise made by
them — in German law the noise made by chickens would fall directly under § 609
BGB, while an invasion of the chickens themselves would be excluded from the duty
to tolerate. In that sense there might be a stricter duty to tolerate the noise but a less
strict duty to tolerate the invasion of the animals themselves.
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not apply and the neighbour could simply invoke § 1004 BGB to terminate
the intrusion. Immissions by heavy or weighable bodies such as rock or stone
chips — or golf and cricket balls — are simply excluded from the duty to
tolerate insigniﬁcant immissions in § 906(1) BGB. In effect, the qualiﬁcation
in § 906 BGB means that there is no level at which any land owner or user has
to tolerate, in a spirit of neighbourly ‘give and take’, immissions from larger
objects such as balls that invade her property as a result of the use of
neighbouring land. On the basis of § 1004 BGB such an invasion by larger
objects is immediately unlawful and the affected neighbour can bring action
to have it terminated without having to prove that it was unreasonable or
beyond what is normal or acceptable in the location.
One could speculate about the reasons for this exclusion from the nuisance
principle in § 906 BGB, but the obvious reason seems to be that larger objects
— objects of a size and consistency that render them weighable — that ﬂy
over the fence and into your property more or less automatically and
self-evidently pose a danger of causing physical damage to property or
personal injury. Consequently, there could be no expectation that neigh-
bours should reasonably put up with that danger. The notion of coming to
the nuisance is not recognised in German law as a complete defence in
nuisance cases.132
III CONCLUSIONS
A number of general conclusions appear possible from these cases. First,
nuisance in the sense of discomfort and annoyance should be distinguished
from nuisance that causes or threatens to cause damage to property or
physical injury; in the latter case the plaintiff can obtain relief by merely
132 The German Federal Administrative Court has decided that a general change in
land use could render a pre-existing use of land on one property unreasonable and
unlawful, even though the use itself never changed materially: BVerwGE 38, 209
(1971) (noise created at a facility where ﬁsh products were loaded onto trucks, often
at night); BVerwGE 49, 365 (1975) (exploitation of stone in a nature conservation
area). According to German constitutional law a user of land cannot insist on
unchanged enjoyment of its favourable characteristics; changing circumstances could
render the use that creates the disturbances unlawful: A J van der Walt Constitutional
Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999) 153, 154–5. This principle also applies
in private law and accordingly the notion of coming to the nuisance has no place in
German law. Prütting op cit note 88 at 125; Westermann, Westermann, Gursky &
Eickmann op cit note 88 at 502. Wolff & Wellenhofer op cit note 88 at 378 seem to
contradict this position, citing BGH NJW 2001, 3119, but the principle they state is
in fact the same: priority in time could prevent an owner who moves into the area
where the nuisance existed from relying on her right to have the nuisance abated, but
will not necessarily do so — it depends on the context of each case. In Dutch law the
fact that the source of the nuisance was in place before the plaintiff arrived or started
using her land in a certain way could indicate that she might have to tolerate the
nuisance: Van Dam, Mijnssen & Van Velten op cit note 43 para 41; Snijders & Rank-
Berenschot op cit note 43 para 183; Reehuis & Heisterkamp with Van Maanen & De
Jong op cit note 43 para 487, citing HR 3 May 1991, NJ 1991, 476; HR 18 Septem-
ber 1998, NJ 1998, 69.
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showing that damage or injury is probable and not that it exceeds the level of
reasonable tolerance between neighbours. At least in principle it seems as if
there is no level of reasonable tolerance as far as physical damage to property
or personal injury are concerned; neighbours do not have to put up with a
real and signiﬁcant threat that property would be damaged or persons might
be injured at all. The fact that the nuisance complained of poses a threat of
damage to property or physical injury steers the application of the normal
nuisance principles in a different direction, reducing the obligation of the
affected neighbour to display tolerance and forbearance and increasing the
likelihood of obtaining injunctive relief to prevent or terminate the nuisance.
In this regard the German principle that larger, weighable objects are
explicitly excluded from the tolerance principle seems to be both laudably
clear and eminently sensible.
However, the decision in Dorland v Smits shows that the threat that
property would be damaged or that physical injury would occur unless the
nuisance is abated or prevented has to be real and signiﬁcant. The courts will
not grant an injunction to terminate or prevent use of property if the danger
that they pose for neighbours is very remote or unlikely. The fact that one or
two stray golf or cricket balls have been known to ﬂy out of the grounds and
onto a not very busy public street now and then is not enough to justify
injunctive relief that would terminate or restrict the use of the sport grounds.
At the same time it is important to distinguish clearly between an analysis of
the facts to ensure that the threat is real and signiﬁcant, and the normal
reasonableness test, which is aimed at establishing whether the nuisance
exceeds the level of tolerance that could be expected of a neighbour.
Neighbours are not expected to bear a real and signiﬁcant threat of damage or
injury at all, and therefore the test in these cases is aimed at establishing
probability and not balancing of interests.
Secondly, coming to the nuisance is generally not recognised as a complete
defence, even though some courts have expressed dismay at the injustice
caused by this rule. Furthermore, even if the courts should accept a defence
based on the notion of coming to the nuisance, this defence should not apply
or be considered at all in the case of a real and imminent threat of damage or
injury. In this perspective the South African Allaclas decision looks justiﬁed,
whereas the English decision in Miller v Jackson looks questionable.
Thirdly, the locality principle applies less strictly in cases where the
nuisance poses a real and imminent threat of damage or injury. It is true that
the locality principle will take up some of the slack left by non-recognition of
coming to the nuisance as a defence, but even then the locality principle (like
the reasonable tolerance principle) seems to be excluded from cases where
the nuisance causes or threatens to cause physical damage to property or
personal injury. Case law in which the locality principle or the tolerance
principle was applied in these cases is questionable.
Finally, as far as remedies are concerned, recent English case law seems to
establish that deviations from the Shelfer principle should not be undertaken
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lightly.133 The idea that injunctive relief is discretionary and that the public
interest should be taken into account when exercising the discretion to
award pecuniary damages in lieu of injunctive relief ﬁnds its limits as soon as
the applicant or plaintiff has established a signiﬁcant (non-marginal) intrusion
on her rights, and again the presence or threat of physical damage to property
or personal injury seems to take the matter over that particular boundary
conclusively. In short, if the nuisance threatens damage or injury, the plaintiff
or applicant is entitled to injunctive relief. In the same spirit, the tendency to
allow certain offenders to continue with their use of the property while
attending to measures to prevent or reduce the nuisance should not ﬁnd
application in the damage and injury cases. The South African decisions in
Allaclas and Laskey illustrate the point well: if the nuisance causes discomfort
or annoyance the courts should exercise their discretion to decide whether
injunctive relief should be implemented immediately or suspended to protect
the legitimate interests of the defendants, but if the nuisance causes or
threatens to cause damage or injury suspension of the injunctive relief should
only be allowed in very exceptional circumstances.
As far as the granting of injunctive relief is concerned, Murphy134 argues
that injunctions appear to be most easily obtained in respect of property and
property-like interests, but that this prioritisation of property is questionable
in so far as it ‘appears to downgrade the status of the right to bodily integrity’.
He therefore proposes that injunctions should be made more easily available
in negligence in cases involving a dangerous state of affairs, particularly one
that threatens bodily integrity. If stronger and stricter protection against
nuisance is justiﬁed when the nuisance threatens to cause damage to property
or personal injury, the protection of personal and physical integrity and safety
should be even stronger than for property interests.
In light of these considerations the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in
Allaclas seems to reﬂect a fairly general, well-motivated and sensible trend in
current law worldwide. It is a pity, however, that the courts have so far failed
to explain the distinction between normal annoyance cases and dangerous
nuisance cases more explicitly and clearly.
133 South African nuisance law was inﬂuenced by English examples on this point.
See Rand Waterraad v Bothma 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v
Annandale 2004 (3) SA281 (C).
134 J Murphy ‘Rethinking injunctions in tort law’ (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 509.
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